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Abstract
Side Channel Attacks (SCA) exploit weaknesses in implementations of cryptographic func-
tions resulting from unintended inputs and outputs such as execution timing, power con-
sumption, electromagnetic radiation, thermal and acoustic emanations. Power Analysis
Attacks (PAA) are a type of SCA in which an attacker measures the power consumption
of a cryptographic device during normal execution. An attempt is then made to uncover
a relationship between the instantaneous power consumption and secret key information.
PAAs can be subdivided into Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential Power Analysis
(DPA), and Correlation Power Analysis (CPA).
Many attacks have been documented since PAAs were first described in 1998. But
since they often vary significantly, it is difficult to directly compare the vulnerability of
the implementations used in each. Research is necessary to identify and develop standard
methods of evaluating the vulnerability of cryptographic implementations to PAAs.
This thesis defines methodologies for performing PAAs on hardware implementations
of AES. The process is divided into identification, extraction, and evaluation stages. The
extraction stage is outlined for both simulated power consumption waveforms as well as for
waveforms captured from physical implementations. An AES encryption hardware design
is developed for the experiment. The hardware design is synthesized with the Synopsys
130-nm CMOS standard cell library. Simulated instantaneous power consumption wave-
forms are generated with Synopsys PrimeTime PX. Single and multiple-bit DPA attacks are
performed on the waveforms. Improvements are applied in order to automate and improve
the precision and performance of the system.
v
The attacks on the simulated power waveforms are successful. The correct key byte is
identified in 15 of the 16 single-bit attacks after 10,000 traces. The single-bit attack which
does not uniquely identify the correct key byte becomes successful after 15,000 or more
traces are applied. The key byte is found in 36 of the 38 multiple-bit attacks. The main
contribution of this work is a methodology and simulation environment which can be used
to design hardware which is resistant to PAA and determine and compare vulnerability.
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1.1 Advanced Encryption Standard
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a symmetric key block cipher. Data is en-
crypted or decrypted in blocks of 16 bytes. Figure 1.1 shows the order in which bytes are
written into the state as plaintext and read from the state as ciphertext [5].
Figure 1.1: AES Top Level
The state is manipulated internally during a variable number of rounds. There are 10,
12, or 14 rounds required for cipher keys of length 128, 192, or 256 bits respectively.
Each round consists of a combination of the four basic operations: SubBytes, ShiftRows,
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MixColumns, and AddRoundKey. The cipher key is expanded into round keys which are
combined with the state during each round [5]. The following description assumes a 128-bit
cipher key.
The arithmetic required to implement AES functionality is performed in the Galois
Field GF (28). Therefore, addition and subtraction are identical and performed modulo 2.
Multiplication between two bytes can be performed with a polynomial representation. Each
byte is represented as a polynomial with the bits as coefficients. Multiplication is performed
as is done with conventional polynomials except modulo an irreducible polynomial. The
irreducible polynomial chosen for the standard is shown in below [5].
m(x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 (1.1)
The SubBytes operation independently transforms each byte of the state. This operation
provides non-linearity and algebraic complexity. SubBytes is comprised of an inversion in
GF (28) and an affine transformation. SubBytes can be implemented as a look-up table
(Figure 1.2) or calculated dynamically [5].
Figure 1.2: AES s-box [5]
The ShiftRows operation provides optimal horizontal diffusion. The bytes in each row
are shifted left an increasing number of times per row. Figure 1.3 shows how each row is
2
shifted [5].
Figure 1.3: AES ShiftRows Operation
The goal of the MixColumns operation is to provide vertical diffusion. Each column
in the state is transformed into a new column. Each byte is considered a coefficient in a
polynomial. This polynomial is then multiplied by a constant polynomial (3x3+x2+x+2)
modulo an irreducible polynomial (x4 + 1). This multiplication can be represented as a
matrix multiplication as shown in Figure 1.4. MixColumns is an invertible operation [5].
Figure 1.4: AES MixColumns Operation
The purpose of the AddRoundKey operation is to combine the cipher and round keys
with the state. This is accomplished with a byte for byte XOR operation. Figure 1.5 shows
this operation [5].
The cipher key is expanded into round keys with the key schedule. One column of the
round key is generated at a time. Figure 1.6 shows how this is accomplished. Most columns
3
Figure 1.5: AES Add Round Key Operation
are generated by combining the bytes of the immediately preceding column with the col-
umn four places back. However, the shaded columns are calculated by first transforming
the previous column with the operation defined as T (x) below.
Figure 1.6: AES Key Schedule
The first step in the T (x) transformation is to vertically shift the column bytes. Then
an s-box byte substitution is performed on each byte in the column. Finally, the first byte
of the column is combined with a round constant. The round constants are generated by
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taking successive powers of the byte 0x02 in the GF (28). The expansion continues until
the required number of round keys are generated [5].
These operations are performed as represented in Figure 1.1 in order to encrypt blocks
of plaintext. The decryption process requires the operations to be inverted and performed
in reverse order [5].
1.2 Side Channel Attacks
Traditionally, cryptanalysis has focused on the plaintext, ciphertext, and secret key of sym-
metric key ciphers as the only relevant sources of information considered during an attack.
Analysis is often completed with only a mathematical model of a cryptographic function.
In such a scenario, only data inputs and outputs are considered relevant. It is assumed that
attackers have absolutely no access to secret key information. This model assumes that the
cryptographic processes are ideal black box functions. In reality, implementations of these
processes are not ideal and interact with the surrounding environment. This interaction
may leak some information. If this information is related to the secret key, attackers can
use it to their advantage [7].
Figure 1.7: Mathematical Representation of Cipher Encryption Operation
Side Channel Attacks attempt to relate such an interaction with the environment to
the internal functioning or data contained in a specific implementation of a cryptographic
function. Such a relationships are side channels of information which leak information
internal to the implementation.
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There are several possible sources through which information can leak. Any measur-
able characteristic of an implementation can be exploited as it likely correlates to the in-
ternal functioning of the device. Examples of measurable characteristics are timing, power
consumption, electromagnetic radiation, thermal, and acoustic emanations.
Specific Side Channel Attacks have been developed to exploit these emanations and
their relationship to the internal operations of the implementation. Such Side Channel
Attacks include Timing Attacks, Power Analysis Attacks, and others. With these attacks,
the relationship between secret information and side channel information can be exploited
[7].
Figure 1.8: Indirect Implementation Outputs
Not only do implementations often react with the surrounding environment through un-
intended outputs, but unintended inputs as well. Environmental conditions or inputs that
affect how a device functions can also be manipulated in order to make a device more likely
to reveal unintended information. This is commonly known as fault analysis [7]. Such
attacks often include inducing faults and studying the resulting behavior of the implemen-
tation. An induced fault will cause the implementation to behave abnormally. Sometimes
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this difference in behavior can give the attacker additional information up to and includ-
ing secret key information. This type of analysis can include temporarily or permanently
damaging the implementation in order to learn more about internal functionality.
Figure 1.9: Indirect Implementation Inputs
Complete evaluation of the strength and security of a cryptographic function requires
consideration of Side Channel Attacks during the design, implementation, and testing
stages. Research is needed in order to identify and develop standard methods of evalu-
ating the vulnerability of cryptographic implementations to Side Channel Attacks.
1.3 Power Analysis Attacks
Power Analysis Attacks are a type of Side Channel Attack where the power consumption
of an executing implementation is used to reveal secret key information [7]. The power
consumption of an implementation can be measured and recorded as it executes. This is
referred to as the instantaneous power consumption. Power Analysis Attacks exploit a
relationship between the instantaneous power consumption and the changing internal state
of a cryptographic implementation.
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Power Analysis Basics
There are three important steps required for any successful Power Analysis Attack. Each
step represents a part of the overall process which allows secret information to be identified
based on the instantaneous power consumption:
• Identify: Find relationship between secret key information and instantaneous power
consumption.
• Extract: Develop method of extracting the state of the relationship information.
• Evaluate: Use this information to determine all or part of the secret key information.
The first step is to identify a relationship between secret key information and instanta-
neous power consumption. Such a relationship varies depending on many factors. There-
fore, this step must be repeated for each specific instance where an implementation is at-
tacked through Power Analysis. Identification focuses the attack on a specific target which
guides the remaining steps of Power Analysis. It includes identifying the inputs which must
be provided, the outputs which are to be measured, and during which part of the execution
the power consumption will be captured.
Once a specific relationship is identified, a process must be developed in order to ex-
tract the state of the relationship during execution. The identified relationship will be
evaluated many times. Each time, the power consumption must be measured and recorded
at a specific instant during execution. This step includes developing a power measurement
configuration, a specific sequence of operations, and an overall process to automate the
capture and storage of power traces and related information.
The extract step provides many power traces, each with accompanying inputs and/or
outputs and any other additional information. Finally, it is necessary to develop a method
to evaluate the relationship in each of these traces. The raw power consumption traces
and additional information are processed in order to determine the most likely value for the
target secret key information being sought. This step is usually completed through software
programs developed in order to process the raw data in a specific way.
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Extracted Information
Power Analysis Attacks identify, extract, and evaluate a relationship between bits of secret
key information and instantaneous power consumption. There are two ways in which these
are related: algorithm level and data bit level power consumption. These are two ways in
which the instantaneous power consumption pattern can change based on data values being
manipulated.
Figure 1.10: Power Trace Showing DES Software Execution [2]
Figure 1.10 shows the instantaneous power consumption of an instruction processor ex-
ecuting a software implementation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). The 16 rounds
of the cipher are clearly represented through the repeating pattern of the power consumption
trace [2]. This trace shows how the sequence of operations executed at the algorithm level
are often expressed through the instantaneous power consumption. Usually the execution of
different operations require different amounts of power. These differing amounts of power
are also usually relatively independent of the data values being manipulated. Therefore, by
examining the power trace, it is often possible to infer to some degree what operations are
taking place at which time.
The expression of the operations being executed over time through the power trace can
be helpful to attackers in general. It can be used to set up more powerful attacks by iden-
tifying at which point during an execution to focus on the power consumption. However,
if the sequence of operations executed depends upon the data values being manipulated,
attackers may be able to identify that data. It is very dangerous for data values to be leaked
9
in this way.
Data dependent execution is sometimes a part of the original algorithm specification.
This may also not be part of the original algorithm, but could be added during implemen-
tation. Implementations differ from the original functional specification often in order to
optimize a specific characteristic such as power, throughput, or latency. Although the AES
algorithm is specifically designed to avoid algorithm level weaknesses. It may still be pos-
sible to add such a vulnerability during implementation.
Variations in instantaneous power consumption are also related to the actual data values
being manipulated [7]. As each bit of data is processed, it consumes power as it charges
and discharges hardware interconnects. This power consumption variation is much more
subtle than the large scale variations based on the sequence of operations performed. These
variations are more difficult to detect and may require modifications to the hardware and/or
statistical techniques in order to identify and correlate the variations. Techniques which
utilize power consumption variations based on data values are much more valuable and
powerful for attackers.
Figure 1.11 shows the instantaneous power consumption of an 8-bit HC05 micropro-
cessor. The diagram shows the power consumption when an 8-bit value is loaded into a
register from memory. The number of bit transitions are annotated. As more bits transition
from logic zero to logic one, more power is consumed [6].
It is important to note that the degree to which the instantaneous power consumption
varies due to the transmission of data values is almost entirely dependent on the hardware
architecture of the target implementation. The variation in Figure 1.11 is very pronounced
because a large data bus is being charged and discharged. Smaller hardware features result
in more subtle power consumption variations which may not be visually identifiable.
Power Analysis Dependencies
Successful Power Analysis Attacks are a complex coordination of many factors. Figure
1.12 shows some of these factors at a high level and their dependencies. Valuable Power
10
Figure 1.11: Power Consumption Resulting from 8-bit Values Transmitted Over Large Data
Bus [6]
Analysis results depend upon the specific implementation, the power measurement config-
uration, system control and automation, and the evaluation algorithms used.
Details of the implementation under investigation are very important. The implementa-
tion itself depends on the characteristics of the device it is running on. The cryptographic
algorithm on which the implementation is based describes the functional inputs and out-
puts. Arguably the most important part is the hardware architecture which the implemen-
tation is run on or describes.
The hardware architecture defines the manner in which the data values are manipulated
and transported. Therefore, it also defines the degree to which the manipulation and trans-
portation of specific data values affects the power consumption. Smart cards with instruc-
tion processors are often more vulnerable since the information is often travelling across
large buses. Such large interconnects require more power to charge than short intercon-
nects. Custom hardware implementations usually have smaller and shorter interconnects
and more parallel processing. This arguably makes them more resistant to power analysis
attacks.
The success of an attack depends to a great degree upon the power measurement config-
uration. In order to perform power analysis, power measuring tools are required. Usually a
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Figure 1.12: Power Analysis Factors and Dependencies
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digital sampling oscilloscope is used to sample the voltage across a resistor in series with
the power source. Up to a certain point, faster sampling is always better. More samples in
less time allows for a higher resolution of the power trace. Digital oscilloscopes sampling
in the range of 1 GHz have been used for such attacks [2]. Often trade-offs must be made
between sampling precision, duration, and space required to store power traces.
A lot of thought and effort can be put into the control of the system. This includes
the configuration, coordination, and automation of all of the other components required for
Power Analysis Attacks.
Finally, there are several methods used to evaluate the resulting power traces gathered
from the device under test. The specific method used as well as the manner in which it
is implemented can affect everything from the accuracy of the results to the performance
of the overall attack. These evaluation algorithms are usually software implementations
which process many power traces offline after they have been gathered.
Specific Power Analysis Attacks
There are several specific types of Power Analysis Attacks described in research. The three
main types of power analysis techniques are Simple Power Analysis (SPA), Differential
Power Analysis (DPA), and Correlation Power Analysis (CPA). Related attacks include us-
ing emitted electromagnetic radiation. DPA can be performed with both single and multiple
target bits. CPA uses a power model of the unit under test which can be developed using
either Hamming Weight or Hamming Distance to estimate power consumption.
• Simple Power Analysis
• Differential Power Analysis
– Single Bit
– Multiple Bit




The biggest difference between these attacks is the way in which the extracted power
consumption is evaluated. SPA usually involves the visual inspection of power traces for
large scale differences. DPA utilizes statistical techniques in order to identify very subtle
variations in power consumption due to differences in the data values being manipulated.
CPA correlates a power model of the unit under test to the actual instantaneous power
consumption.
1.4 Scope of Work
This research outlines a methodology which can be used to perform Power Analysis At-
tacks on hardware implementations of AES. The main contribution of this work is the de-
velopment of an instantaneous power consumption simulation environment leveraging the
latest Synopsys EDA tools with a 130-nm standard cell library. The environment can be
used to design hardware which is resistant to Power Analysis Attacks. The vulnerability of
different implementations can be directly compared. This evaluation of implementations
allows a design to be strengthened against attacks before being physically implemented.
The result of this is a reduction in vulnerability after less time and with lower costs.
An attempt is also made to attack the physical hardware implementation. This did not
result in a unique identification of the correct key guess. Although this attempt did not





2.1 Simple Power Analysis
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) is the most basic form of power analysis and the easiest to
defend against or avoid. It involves inspecting power traces for large scale differences based
on the operations performed. Implementations where the execution sequence depends on
the data values being manipulated are more vulnerable than implementations with an inde-
pendent and static execution sequence [7].
Higher operating frequencies and parallel computations usually render hardware imple-
mentations less vulnerable to SPA than software implementations. It is sometimes possible
to discern exactly which instruction is being processed in a software implementation by
examining the power trace [1]. SPA often makes it possible to reveal the hamming weight
of data values being manipulated during execution of a software implementation [6].
The design of a cryptographic function can make it much less likely to suffer from
SPA vulnerabilities brought on by the implementation. Ciphers designed with consistent
operations independent of the underlying data are less likely to result in vulnerable imple-
mentations. The design of AES avoids such operations which makes it more resistant to
this type of attack.
When SPA is unsuccessful, it can still be used to set up more advanced power analysis
attacks. SPA can be used to identify which power samples will be used in further analysis,
or at what point in time samples should be gathered during the functioning of the device.
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2.2 Differential Power Analysis
The goal of Differential Power Analysis is to guess secret key information. In order to
accomplish this goal, a relationship must be identified between secret information and in-
stantaneous power consumption. One way to establish this relationship is to identify and
observe a combination of secret and known data and make a prediction about the result.
This prediction or expected value is the target data. The power consumption is correlated
to the target data. Therefore, the correct key guess results in a calculated target value which
correlates to the actual power consumption. Figure 2.1 shows two general ways in which
this relationship can be established. In both scenarios, a combination is performed which
involves known, unknown, and expected data.
Figure 2.1: General DPA Target Relationship
DPA attacks can either be known/chosen plaintext or known ciphertext attacks. A por-
tion of the secret key is guessed. Then the target data is calculated. A main assumption is
that the target data values are related to instantaneous power consumption. Therefore, the
plaintext and the key are also related to the instantaneous power consumption.
Figure 2.2 shows how this general relationship can be adapted specifically for the AES
cipher. The relationship associated with the input plaintext includes the initial AddRound-
Key and ByteSubstitution in order to calculate the target byte. The relationship associated
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with the output ciphertext also includes the ShiftRows operation. However, this is a super-
ficial change which only changes the order of the bytes in the state.
Figure 2.2: AES Specific Target Relationship
This relationship is used in the evaluation process. Figure 2.3 describes the evaluation
process for a single key guess. For each plaintext and power trace pair, a selection function
uses the calculated target data to determine which of two groups of traces the current trace
will be associated with. Each group is half of a differential pair. Each trace in the differen-
tial pair is created by summing and accumulating traces associated with it. After all traces
have been accumulated, one trace of the differential pair is subtracted from the other. This
results in one differential trace for each key guess.
Figure 2.4 represents results one would expect from a subset of the entire evaluation
process. The colored dots represent samples in multiple power traces. White dots represent
samples with a slightly higher power consumption. Black dots represent power consump-
tion samples with a lower power consumption. In this representation, a single power trace
is composed of ten samples and one is outlined in a blue line.
Twenty traces have been separated into two groups, this is done once for the correct key
guess and once with an incorrect guess. One group is associated with an expected target bit
equal to one and the other equal to zero. With the correct key guess, the expected target bit
is equivalent to the actual target bit. The green line shows the point in time along the traces
17
Figure 2.3: Differential Power Analysis Evaluation Process
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when the power consumption is affected by the target bit. In this model, one sample in each
trace is affected by the power consumption when a target bit is produced by the hardware
and charged on transmit lines.
Figure 2.4: Differential Power Analysis Expected Results
When the correct key guess is used, all of the samples at the target time have a slightly
lower power consumption in one group and a slightly higher power consumption in the
other group. When these traces are averaged, all other variations in the power traces are
averaged to some nominal value. The difference of the differential pairs will reveal a large
spike when the correct key guess is used to calculate the expected target value. Such a
spike does not occur with the incorrect key guess. An incorrect key guess causes the power
traces to be grouped in a way which has no meaning. This is how the correct key guess can
be uniquely identified from the other guesses.
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As more power traces are used during an attack, uncorrelated power differences in
the differential trace are further reduced. The result of this is that the differential trace
associated with the correct key guess is easier to uniquely identify from the others.
Differential Power Analysis Attacks are more powerful than SPA [1]. They are also
more difficult to defend against than SPA. DPA uses statistical analysis of power traces in
an attempt to correlate smaller power consumption variations to secret key information.
Error correction techniques can also be applied in order to refine these relationships. This
analysis allows DPA to utilize information not only from high level operations, but also
from the data values being manipulated [1].
2.3 Correlation Power Analysis
Correlation Power Analysis is related to DPA. However, CPA requires more detailed knowl-
edge of the design of the system under attack. A model of the power consumption of a small
target execution sequence of the hardware is built. The resulting power consumption of the
model is compared to the actual power consumption of the device under test. The power
trace of the model should correlate well with the power trace of the device under test when
the two share the same target data bits [9].
In CMOS hardware circuits, the largest power consumption variation occurs when there
is a change in the voltage level of the output or intermediate values of the circuit. Therefore,
models of hardware power consumption focus on the number of bit transitions present [9].
Two models of hardware power consumption are suggested for CPA. These are called
the Hamming Distance and Hamming Weight models [6]. The Hamming Distance or tran-
sition count is a measure of the number of bits that transition during an operation on data.
The Hamming Weight model assumes that the power consumption is most related to the
number of active bits resulting from an operation [9].
Since a hardware power model is necessary to conduct CPA, this model can be used
to conduct fully simulated attacks. A fully simulated attack generates a prediction of the
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success of an actual physical attack. The success of a simulated attack when compared to





Power Analysis was first described by Kocher in 1998 [1] and 1999 [2] while working at
Cryptography Research, Inc. This initial work describes how and why the power consump-
tion of an implementation can be related to secret information. It outlines the basics of SPA
and DPA. Both papers describe the steps and theory behind attacking a DES implementa-
tion.
3.2 Single-Bit DPA
A paper by Aigner and Oswald in 2000 [4] presents the fundamentals of Single-Bit DPA
while demonstrating such an attack on a software implementation of DES. The goal was
to determine six bits of a subkeyblock which is related to the secret key. The attack only
requires a set of ciphertexts from the encryption process. The key used in the encryption
is unknown. A power trace of the last encryption round is associated with each ciphertext.
A target bit is selected which can be determined by solving backwards from the ciphertext
assuming knowledge of the correct subkeyblock. This process of solving backwards is
called a selection function. The selection function therefore categorizes the ciphertexts
(and corresponding power samples) into two different groups depending on the value of
the target bit [4].
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Since the selection function also relies on the subkeyblock, the correct subkeyblock
will allow the selection function to correctly differentiate two groups of ciphertexts and
power traces. The wrong subkeyblock will cause the selection function to separate the
power samples in a way that makes the two groups statistically indistinguishable. Aigner
and Oswald use the moments of the distributions of the power traces in order to charac-
terize them statistically. Specifically, the statistical mean is used to estimate the expected
value of each distribution of power samples. Therefore, for each subkeyblock guess, the
difference between the means of the power samples in the two groups created by the selec-
tion function is calculated. If done correctly, there will be a spike in the difference between
the means of the distributions associated with the correct subkeyblock. This exposes the
correct subkeyblock which is secret information related to the key [4].
3.3 Multiple-Bit DPA
A paper by Messerges in 2002 extends the idea of basic single-bit DPA [6]. The technique
is applied to a software implementation of DES. A selection function is used as with single-
bit DPA in order to separate the power traces and ciphertexts into groups. With multiple-bit
DPA, however, the selection function is modified to consider multiple target bits. The goal
of this method was to increase the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR).
There are several types of noise which are combined with the overall power signal when
it is measured. These include “external, intrinsic, quantization, sampling, and algorithmic”
noise [6]. The SNR is higher when the magnitude of the power measurement signal is
higher. The power measurement signal is higher when the hamming weight of the data
values being manipulated is higher. In fact, this paper shows how the voltage level mea-
sured for certain load instructions is directly related to the hamming weight of the data
transferred. Using this fact, the authors present an “all-or-nothing d-bit DPA attack”. This
attack uses the multiple bit output from the selection function to categorize the power traces
and corresponding ciphertexts into three groups. One of the groups stores the ciphertexts
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for which the selection function results in all zeros. The second group is used when the
output of the selection function is all ones. The final group is for all other results and is not
used [6].
A “generalized d-bit DPA attack” is also defined as an alternative to the “all-or-nothing
d-bit DPA attack”. Equation 3.1 shows how the power traces are divided into groups. D(· )
is the selection function. The function wt(x) results in the Hamming weight of x. The
number of output bits in the selection function is represented by n. The variable d is a
threshold [6].
S0 = {Si[j] | wt[D(· )] ≤ n− d}
S1 = {Si[j] | wt[D(· )] ≥ d}
S2 = {Si[j] | Si[j] @ S0, S1}
(3.1)
The higher the threshold d, the more polarized the groups become with respect to Ham-
ming weight of the output of the selection function. When d = n, the attack is equivalent
to an “all-or-nothing d-bit DPA attack” [6].
3.4 Correlation Power Analysis
The 2004 work by Örs and Aigner presents a power analysis attack on an ASIC implemen-
tation of AES [9]. The attack is referred to as version of DPA, but later research brands it
Correlation Power Analysis in order to avoid confusion [15]. This paper represents the first
Power Analysis attack on a hardware implementation of AES [9].
The target of the attack is the eight most significant bits of a register that stores the
result of the initial AddRoundKey. This operation is an XOR of eight key bits with eight
plaintext bits [9].
The correlation between power traces can be calculated with the Pearson correlation
constant as shown in equation 3.2. The set of predicted power traces is represented by P .
T represents the set of measured power traces. The expected value, or average, of the set T
is represented by E(T ). V ar(T ) represents the variance of the set T [9].
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C(T, P ) =
E(T · P )− E(T ) · E(P )√
V ar(T ) · V ar(P ) (3.2)
When the eight key bits of the prediction trace are the same as the measured trace, the
correlation is expected to be much higher than otherwise [9].
Simulated Attack
A simulated attack is performed first in order to judge the success of an attack with actual
measurements. A behavioral HDL simulator uses the hardware design to write the number
of bit changes of the target register to a file [9].
First, a matrix is built of values from 0 to 128 representing the number of bit transitions
of the entire target register. The matrix contains a column for each of ten rounds and a row
for each of 10,000 plaintexts. Then, with the same key and plaintexts, a second “prediction”
matrix is produced with the number of bit transitions of only the most significant eight bits
of the target register. This is done for only the initial AddRoundKey transformation. The
correlation is then calculated between the second matrix and every column (round) of the
first matrix. The correlation is much higher between the second matrix and the first column
of the first matrix than any other columns of the first matrix. This shows that even with
the added noise of the entire register changing bits, the simplistic prediction has a strong
relationship with the correct round [9].
The second prediction matrix is calculated again with a different key and the correlation
disappears. Finally, a full CPA attack is performed with the simulation data. A prediction
is made for all 256 possible values of the eight bits of the target key. The correct key target
bits are clearly detected as shown in Figure 3.1. It is determined that at least 400 plaintexts
are required in order to determine the correct bits of the key [9].
Physical Attack
During the physical attack, the hardware circuit is clocked at 2 MHz. The oscilloscope used
to capture the power traces samples at 1 GHz. Power measurements are taken from the first
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Figure 3.1: Simulation correlation [9]
two clock cycles where the first AddRoundKey is calculated and the values are captured
into the register. 500 measurements are taken from each cycle. The data is pre-processed
by averaging in order to reduce noise [9].
The correlation is calculated between the measured power trace and each prediction
generated from the simulation, one for every possible key byte value. Figure 3.2 shows the
correlation results. The correlation of the correct key byte (153) is the highest [9].
In addition, the authors sought to find which set of data points from the two cycles
maximized the correlation. The 50 data points centered around the second rising edge have
this effect. The minimum number of plaintexts required is also valuable information. The
data in this paper puts that number at around 4000 plaintexts [9].
3.5 Improved DPA Attack
The 2007 paper by Han et al. presents an improved attack by choosing plaintext inputs that
maximize the difference between power traces [13]. Single-bit DPA, multi-bit DPA, CPA,
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Figure 3.2: Hardware correlation between measurement and predictions [9]
and the improved DPA attacks are performed and evaluated on a simulated hardware im-
plementation of AES. The improved DPA attack detects the correct subkey byte with 5120
power traces. CPA also detects the correct subkey byte with only 4000 power traces. How-
ever, the improved attack requires less computational overhead and represents a simpler
attack.
An improved power model is presented based on the Hamming weight of intermedi-
ate results of the AES function. An intermediate value I depends on the plaintext x, the
key k, and the time t. The power consumption is based on the Hamming weight of this
intermediate value with a gain and a constant offset [13].
P (t) = aH[I(x, t, k)] + b (3.3)
For two different plaintexts x1 and x2, the intermediate values I1 and I2 that represent
the largest Hamming difference will result in the largest difference in power measurements.
Therefore, for each subkey guess, the plaintexts that result in intermediate values that are
all active and all inactive can be chosen in order to maximize the difference of power traces
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[13].
Since only one byte of subkey is guessed at a time, only a byte of the plaintext needs to
be set to appropriate values. The other bits of the plaintext are set to random values in order
to average and reduce the correlation from other intermediate values of the circuit with the
power trace [13].
Two sets of plaintext inputs are generated for each subkey guess Ks. Each set has a
constant plaintext byte x1 and x2 which when combined with Ks results in intermediate
values of 0x00 and 0xFF . These are held constant over m sets of plaintexts with the other
bits being random values [13].
S1(Ks) = {S1[Ks, i] : (x1, PT i[119 : 0]) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
S2(Ks) = {S2[Ks, i] : (x2, PT i[119 : 0]) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
(3.4)
When each subkey guess is evaluated, the two plaintext sets in 3.4 are encrypted at time
t. Two power trace sets E(S1(Ks), t) and E(S2(Ks), t) are generated. Each power trace
set is summed and the totals are subtracted from each other as shown in 3.5. The correct




E(S1[Ks, i], t) −
m∑
i=1
E(S2[Ks, i], t) (3.5)
The simulated AES hardware design is clocked at 2.5 MHz and the power is sampled
at 1 GHz. The target of the power traces was the first two clock cycles where the initial key
addition is performed and then loaded into a register [13].
The researchers were unable to detect the correct subkey byte with single-bit DPA.
6000 power traces were required to detect the correct subkey byte with multi-bit DPA.
CPA allowed the detection in 4000 traces. The improved DPA technique uses 5120 power
traces but only consists of summing and subtracting. CPA requires many more calculations




Three different hardware designs are used for power analysis attacks in these experiments.
These include the Simple Circuit, Custom Iterative, and AES Core Modules from Open-
Cores.org [10]. The Simple Circuit hardware design is not an AES implementation. It is
designed for the purpose of identifying the instantaneous power consumption in order to
verify the power measurement configuration. The Custom Iterative design is a very sim-
ple serial implementation of AES. This design avoids any parallel execution which could
complicate a Power Analysis Attack. The implementation from OpenCores.org is a prac-
tical implementation which provides higher throughput and lower latency than the Custom
Iterative design.
4.1 Simple Circuit
The purpose of the Simple Circuit hardware designs is to determine to what degree chang-
ing and transporting data bits on an FPGA affects the instantaneous power consumption.
These designs are intended to be used to verify the power measurement configuration.
They can be used to verify that the capacitance on the hardware power lines is low enough
to permit signals of the expected magnitude and frequency. The configuration and use of
the oscilloscope can be verified. This includes things such as the horizontal delay, sampling
rate, and other configuration parameters.
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Figure 4.1 shows how the design is configured at the top level. Data and control regis-
ters are loaded over a serial RS-232 UART connection by a host computer. An oscilloscope
is configured to read the instantaneous power consumption when a trigger event occurs.
The trigger is activated by the Simple Circuit hardware design.
Figure 4.1: Simple Circuit Top Level General
The Simple Circuit design changes and transports many logic values simultaneously.
This is accomplished by simultaneously inverting 256 8-bit data registers on each rising
clock edge during the transfer state. Figure 4.2 shows the hardware architecture for one
data bit. Initially the data registers are loaded from the computer over RS-232. Then the
input multiplexer is changed to read the inverted state of the register. For each cycle during
this configuration, one of the lines will be pulled low and the other will be pulled high.
Each cycle, the power consumption from those data lines toggling should be seen on the
power trace.
There are three different types of Simple Circuit designs. The differences between
the three are architectural differences meant to enhance the degree to which the power
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Figure 4.2: Simple Circuit Single Data Bit Architecture
consumption varies due to data bits being transferred. They are named inverting, leds, and
logic locked. The leds and logic locked designs are based on the inverting design. The
leds design simply wires the first data byte to LEDs on the development platform. The
logic locked design stretches the implementation across the FPGA by locking placement
to be in specific locations. All three of these architectures have identical control state
machines.
There are control registers which can be written by the host computer in order to control
the Simple Circuit architecture. These are shown in table 4.1. There are registers which
control the timing in cycles of the waiting before and after the data bits are inverted. The
repeat transfer register controls how many times the data is inverted. The repeat trace
registers are especially useful when using an equivalent-time oscilloscope.
Address Register Description
0 execution holdoff Number of cycles in posttrigger state
1 trigger holdoff Number of cycles in posttransfer state
2 repeat trace (LSB) Number of times to repeat entire process (Least Significant Byte)
3 repeat trace (MSB) Number of times to repeat entire process (Most Significant Byte)
4 repeat transfer Number of cycles to repeat transfer state
5 load data Send 512 data bytes
Table 4.1: Simple Circuit Control Registers
The Simple Circuit control state machine is shown in Figure 4.3. The hardware waits
for a command byte from the host computer. If the command byte is 0x00−0x04, then the
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next byte read in is written to the associated control register. If the command byte is 0x05,
the hardware waits for 512 data bytes to be transferred from the host computer.
Figure 4.3: Simple Circuit System Control State Diagram
Once the data is transferred from the host computer to the hardware, the state machine
immediately starts the data inverting process. First a trigger is sent out which lasts for
one clock cycle. Then the post-trigger wait lasts for the number of cycles specified in the
execution holdoff register. Then the transfer state is executed for the specified number of
cycles. This is where the data registers are inverted once per cycle. After the data inversion,
wait cycles are inserted during the post transfer state. Here the entire process can begin
again or it can end. If it ends, the hardware writes the data bytes back to the host computer.
The control state machine provides for configurable waits so different oscilloscopes
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can be used. Different scopes have different minimum requirements for trigger hold-off,
horizontal delay, and other parameters. One hardware design can support all of these. Also,
equivalent-time oscilloscopes require one trigger per each sample. The Simple Circuit
hardware can be configured to support this without having to pay the penalty for the UART
communication each time.
Figure 4.4: Simple Circuit Top Level Testbench
In order to verify functionality and assist development, a testbench is used which con-
nects the Simple Circuit hardware to a model of a host computer with a UART. Data values
are read from an input file which contains the command bytes, control register values, and
data to be inverted. The resulting output data is written to an output file.
The baud rate of the UART is set to 9600 bits per second. In order to avoid this time
during simulation, some useful synthesizer directives are used. Figure 4.5 shows how the
directives are used. With these statements, different code is used between the simulation
and actual hardware synthesis. This is used both to speed up the UART during simulation,
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and also to use only 4 data bytes instead of 512.
Figure 4.5: Useful Altera Synthesis Directives [18]
Hardware simulations are completed in ModelSim PE 6.3a. Figure 4.6 shows a simu-
lation waveform for the Simple Circuit hardware design. Note that only four data bytes are
being used. These bytes are inverted once per cycle during the transfer state. The number
of cycles in each of the posttrigger, transfer, and posttransfer states are controlled by the
control registers.
Figure 4.6: Simple Circuit System Control Waveform
The most advanced Simple Circuit is the one which is Logic Locked. The Altera Quar-
tus II software allows hardware designs to be partitioned by entity. These partitions can
have either fixed or variable positions and/or size. When they are fixed, they are set by the
user and when they are variable, they are set by the Fitter. In order to maximize power
consumption, the third Simple Circuit Design was separated into partitions and locked into
either side of the FPGA. All of the data registers are locked on the left side of the chip. The
output multiplexer which is used to read the data back to the host computer is locked on
the right side of the chip.
This partitioning is shown in Figure 4.7. The output multiplexer is on the right side
and all other logic is on the left. The two pink rectangles are the design partitions. The
logic elements are identified by the blue colored regions. The gray color represents local
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Figure 4.7: Simple Circuit Logic Locked Placement and Routing Map
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routing and the gold represents the global routing. The long routing channels between the
data registers and the output multiplexers will require more power to charge than shorter
local routing.
During each cycle of the transfer state, the data from the registers is inverted. That
means during each cycle, some data lines are being pulled high. However, the long routing
across the Logic Locked design are only charged when the output of the registers change
from logic zero to logic one. Therefore, the power consumption difference should be seen
every other cycle during the transfer state. This is why the hardware is designed so that the
data bits which are inverted are written from the host computer. There they can be changed
to different proportions of active bits. This also keeps the synthesis tool from removing
the logic as unnecessary. The data is read back out for the same reason and to verify the
inversion.
4.2 Custom Iterative
The Custom Iterative hardware design is a serial AES design. The design is constructed in
a structural manner. It is designed to encrypt with a 128-bit cipher key. Figure 4.8 shows
a system level diagram of the design. A serial RS-232 UART is used to communicate with
a host computer. The system controller block is used to maintain the control registers and























When the system starts executing, it waits for a command which signals the start of a
plaintext transfer. When the controller receives the byte 0x02 over the UART, it will store
the next 16 bytes received into plaintext registers. Once all 16 plaintext bytes have been
stored into registers, the system begins the encryption. The system controller holds the
clock enable and chip select lines of the UART such that it does not operate during the
trigger, post-trigger wait, and encryption process. The UART is held inactive during this
time to avoid unnecessary noise on the power lines. The system control interface is the
same as that of the OpenCores.org AES Core Modules design.
The design of the Custom Iterative AES hardware is also very structural. Figure 4.9
shows a top level diagram of the Custom Iterative AES design. There is a single entity
which acts exclusively as the control unit for the entire design. There are four identical
memory units named aes dual row mem. Each unit contains two banks which can each
store a row of the state matrix. Collectively, this memory is used to store the previous and
next state of the encryption.
The execution units for the four operations of AES are lined up and grouped together.
The aes byte substitution unit performs the non-linear inversion in the Galois Field GF (28).
This is implemented as a look-up table. Since the shift rows operation changes only the
location and not the byte values in the encryption state, it is implemented as a direct connec-
tion. The control unit is programmed to reorder the bytes during this step of the encryption.
The bytes are simply read from a different location than they are written to between the two
row banks. The aes mix columns unit requires access to a byte in all four rows simulta-
neously. This is the motivation behind having a separate memory unit for each row of the
encryption state.
The aes add round key unit is simply an XOR between an input byte of the state and
a byte of the cipher key or the round key. The aes round key unit supplies the key bytes






















The control state machine of the Custom Iterative AES design is shown in Figure 4.10.
The control unit coordinates the datapath elements to process one byte of the state matrix
per cycle. Therefore, each AES encryption operation requires 16 clock cycles.
Figure 4.10: Custom Iterative State Diagram
After loading 16 bytes of plaintext into bank 0, the initial operation (AddRoundKey) is
performed over each byte in the state. Since the operation is independent between bytes in
the state, the input byte is replaced by the output byte in the same bank. Byte substitution
is performed in the same manner. The ShiftRows operation changes the location of the
bytes in each row. The encryption state data is transferred from bank 0 to bank 1 as this
happens. MixColumns also requires an independent copy of the input and output state data.
Therefore, MixColumns reads from bank 1 and writes the result into bank 0.
MixColumns is not performed in the final round of encryption. During this final round,






















Figure 4.11 shows a simplified diagram of the Custom Iterative hardware datapath. One
important design decision is how to design the units which require memory. These units
include the state information, expanded key memory, and s-box ROM. The memory units
can be implemented with either registers or memory blocks. Memory blocks can either be
explicitly instantiated or the VHDL can be organized so that the synthesis tools can infer
memory blocks. Writing to memory is necessarily a synchronous operation. However,
reading can be implemented with either synchronous or asynchronous logic.
In order for the Altera Quartus II synthesis software to automatically infer memory, the
reading operations require registers on the inputs of the address lines [18]. This requires
that the read operation is synchronous. This slight memory difference significantly changes
the design and operation of the system controller. In order for the memory read interface to
be synchronous, the address lines must be available the cycle before the data is required for
computation. This adds significant complexity when working with three separate memory
units. It would also make it more difficult to determine what operation is taking place at
which time when the circuit is being used for power analysis. An implementation intending
to be optimized for throughput, latency, or area may implement the memory units in a
different way.
Therefore, all memory reads in the design are implemented as combinational reads. As
a consequence of this, all of the memory is implemented in registers on the target device.
In order to simplify the design, and since only a single key will be attacked at a time, the
expanded key is written into the key memory unit as a ROM. This expansion and VHDL
formatting is accomplished off-line in a Java software program.
Custom Iterative Mix Columns Design
The most complicated part of the Custom Iterative architecture is the Mix Columns oper-
ation. This can be implemented in many different ways. The goal of the architecture is to
compute one byte at a time. In order to develop an architecture which performs in this way,
it is necessary to examine the math behind the AES Mix Columns computation.
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The main purpose of the Mix Columns operation is to vertically diffuse information
along each column in the AES state matrix. In order to accomplish this, each byte in a
column is considered a coefficient in a polynomial. This polynomial is then multiplied by
the constant polynomial 3x2 +x2 +x+2. Table 4.2 shows how the bytes are read from the
first column of the state matrix [5].
The arithmetic is performed in the Galois Finite Field GF (28). Therefore, addition is
simply an XOR operation. Multiplication is more complicated, but can be simplified since





Table 4.2: Mix Columns Byte Ordering
The column bytes represented as coefficients of a polynomial are multiplied by the
constant polynomial as shown in Equation 4.1.
b3x
3 + b2x
2 + b1x + b0
× 3x3 + x2 + x + 2
2b3x
3 + 2b2x
















The result must be four bytes represented as the coefficients of the variables x3, x2, x1, x0.
Finite field arithmetic is used to reduce the variables with higher exponents by the polyno-





2 + 2b1x + 2b0
b2x
3 + b1x
2 + b0x + b3
b1x
3 + b0x
2 + b3x + b2
3b0x
3 + 3b3x
2 + 3b2x + 3b1
(4.2)
The output from this sum of products results in four bytes. The array can be reordered
such that each row corresponds to an output byte. Therefore, the first row corresponds to
the output byte associated with x0. The array can also be ordered such that each column is
associated with an input byte (b0, b1, b2, b3).
2b0 + 3b1 + b2 + b3










Then the sum of products can be represented by a matrix multiplication as in Equation
4.4. This is after the variables from the polynomial representation are removed. This
equation clearly shows how each byte in the next state column is based on every byte in the
current state column. This is how the vertical diffusion is performed.


2 3 1 1
1 2 3 1
1 1 2 3






















The Custom Iterative design aims to calculate one output byte per cycle. From the
matrix multiplication representation, it is easy to see how each next state column byte
can be calculated by multiplying each current state column byte by either 1, 2, or 3 and
summing the products together.
A hardware design of these calculations with these goals can be represented as in Figure
4.12. The inputs of the operation include the four bytes of the current state column and the
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row where the output byte will be placed. The output is the resulting byte representing the
sum of products of the input bytes.
The four identical components represent hardware units which multiply an input byte
by either 1, 2, or 3. This results in a product byte and a carry bit. The Row Decoder module
determines the constant each input byte is multiplied by.
Figure 4.12: Custom Iterative Mix Columns Mode Diagram
The resulting products and carry bits are summed together with XOR logic. If the sum
of the carry bits results in an active bit, the resulting byte must be reduced by the byte 0x1B.
This operation is simply a conditional addition (XOR).
row mode0 mode1 mode2 mode3
00 10 11 01 01
01 01 10 11 01
10 01 01 10 11
11 11 01 01 10
Table 4.3: Custom Iterative Mode Decode
The combinational output from the Row Decoder is shown in Table 4.3. This is calcu-
lated from Equation 4.4. The multiplication units are a simplification of full multiplication
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in GF (28). The calculations are shown in Table 4.4 with VHDL notation. Multiplying by
two is simply a bit shift left. Multiplying by three is the same as multiplying by two with
an additional addition.
mode Meaning out carry
00 in · 1 in 0
10 in · 2 in(6 downto 0) & ’0’ in(7)
11 in · 3 in(6 downto 0) & ’0’ xor in in(7)
Table 4.4: Custom Iterative Mix Columns Multiplication
Custom Iterative Performance
The serial design of this implementation causes the speed and throughput performance
measurements to be relatively low as compared to other AES implementations. The com-
plete encryption requires about 672 cycles as calculated in Equation 4.5. This calculation
assumes a simplification of 10 full rounds. This is equivalent to the actual implementation
since there is an initial transformation (Add Round Key) as well as a final round with the
Mix Columns operation missing.
total cycles = loadPT + rounds · (operations · 16) + storeCT
total cycles = 16 + 10 · (4 · 16) + 16
total cycles = 672 cycles
(4.5)
The total resource utilization from the system level implementation as reported from
the Altera Quartus II Fitter is shown in Figure 4.13. A more detailed break down of the
resource utilization by entity is shown in Figure 4.14. It is important to note that no memory
bits were used to implement the AES components in the Custom Iterative implementation.
All memory is implemented with registers.
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Figure 4.13: Custom Iterative Resource Utilization
Figure 4.14: Custom Iterative Resource Utilization by Entity
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4.3 AES Core Modules
The AES Core Modules hardware implementation is freely available from OpenCores.org
[10]. This design was used to help learn about AES and to test out an attack on a phys-
ical hardware implementation. The design is highly parallel and optimized for increased
throughput. It can be configured to use a 128, 192, or 256-bit cipher key. Figure 4.15
shows when the operations are performed. The diagram shows what operations are being
performed during clock cycles through the execution. The hexadecimal numbers represent
the current clock cycle.
Figure 4.15: AES Core Modules Coordination [10]
The input plaintext is loaded in one byte per cycle for 16 total cycles. Then each
round is performed over ten cycles each. The SubBytes and ShiftRows operations are
performed simultaneously as are the MixColumns and AddRoundKey operations. The
final AddRoundKey operation is performed as the output ciphertext is being provided as
output.
Figure 4.16 shows how the data is manipulated as it is transferred between memory
units. The square arrays represent byte memory which holds state information as it changes
throughout the encryption. Two operations are performed simultaneously as the state is
modified one column per cycle. The input bytes are gathered one per cycle into a column.
The output bytes are read directly from the state table.
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Figure 4.16: AES Core Modules Memory [10]
This is a practical design which seeks increased throughput and decreased latency at the
cost of increased area. The AES Core Modules implementation requires 129 clock cycles




Power traces can be generated by simulating the execution of hardware implementations.
Attacks mounted on these traces allow experimentation without the complexity of a phys-
ical power extraction. The main concerns associated with simulated power extraction are
maintaining power trace sample precision and producing compact output files as quickly
as possible. This research simulates the execution of the Custom Iterative hardware imple-
mentation.
Figure 5.1: Top Level Simulation Flow
Simulated power extraction involves two steps. First the hardware design is compiled
and synthesized into an implementation. Then the execution of the implementation is sim-
ulated many times with different input vectors each time. The associated input data and
power trace are then paired and stored until they are required for evaluation.
Synopsys electronic design automation (EDA) tools are utilized for compilation, syn-
thesis, and simulation of the hardware design. Several other utilities are used for supporting
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the simulated power extraction. All of these tools are run on the Community ENTerprise
Operating System (CentOS).
5.1 Design Synthesis
Hardware compilation and synthesis requires the operation of several tools. Figure 5.2
shows how these tools operate over resources. Tools are shown as circles and resources
are expressed as rectangles. The Perl script compile.pl invokes Synopsys dc shell. The
Custom Iterative hardware source files are read in and parsed by the dc shell tool. It then
synthesizes an implementation netlist built from standard cells provided by the core typ.db
130 nm library. This netlist is then written back out into aes encryption ken.vhdg.
Figure 5.2: Hardware Synthesis and Simulation Executable Generation Flow
The vhdlan tool parses the generated netlist and the top-level testbench. The standard
cell library Verilog model core.v is parsed with the vlogan utility. A simulation executable
(simv) is created with the VCS tool.
The commands executed for hardware synthesis are shown in Figure 5.3. The top level
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specified for the simulation is the hardware testbench. This is done so that the testbench
can operate the unit under test which is the Custom Iterative hardware implementation.
1 ## Compile hardware d e s i g n
2 ## Produces n e t l i s t a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n . vhdg
3 d c s h e l l −f . . / . . / s c r i p t s / s y n t h . s c r i p t
4
5 ## Parse t h e s t a n d a r d c e l l l i b r a r y
6 v l og a n . . / . . / s r c / l i b / v e r i l o g / c o r e . v
7
8 ## Parse t h e n e t l i s t
9 vh d l a n a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n . vhdg
10
11 ## Parse t h e t e s t b e n c h
12 vh d l a n . . / . . / s r c / h d l / t b / a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n t b
13
14 ## S y n t h e s i z e hardware d e s i g n
15 ## Produces t h e . / s imv f i l e f o r s i m u l a t i o n
16 vcs −debug −ve rb AES ENCRYPTION KEN TB
Figure 5.3: Hardware Synthesis and Simulation Executable Generation Commands
Figure 5.4 shows the commands executed by dc shell in order to synthesize the hard-
ware design from standard cells. The hardware testbench is excluded from the synthesis.
5.2 Power Simulation
The hardware is synthesized only once. Simulations of the synthesized hardware are per-
formed many times. Therefore, the simulation is performed in a separate script. Figure 5.5
is a diagram of the simulation flow. For each simulation, the script simulate.pl is executed.
The basic commands executed in simulate.pl are shown in Figure 5.6. The simv simulation
executable is executed. The executable reads commands from a DO file (Figure 5.7). The
executable runs the simulation for 28 µs at the default resolution of 10 ps. The testbench is
specified as the top level. This ensures that the input vectors are read that contain a plain-
text vector. The testbench also writes the resulting ciphertext to an output file. It is also
important that the DO file causes the simulation executable to dump the signal values after
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1 s e t s e a r c h p a t h { . . / . . / s r c / h d l / r t l \\
2 . . / . . / s r c / h d l / t b \\
3 . . / . . / s r c / l i b / v e r i l o g \\
4 . . / . . / s r c / l i b / s nps .}
5 s e t t a r g e t l i b r a r y { c o r e t y p . db}
6 s e t l i n k l i b r a r y {∗ c o r e t y p . db}
7
8 s e t c o m p i l e c l o c k g a t i n g t h r o u g h h i e r a r c h y t r u e
9 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n . vhd ”
10 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” a e s a d d r o u n d k e y . vhd ”
11 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” a e s b y t e s u b s t i t u t i o n . vhd ”
12 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” aes dua l row mem . vhd ”
13 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” a e s e n c r y p t c o n t r o l . vhd ”
14 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n . vhd ”
15 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” aes key mem . vhd ”
16 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” a e s m i x c o l u m n s . vhd ”
17 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” a e s r e a d m u x . vhd ”
18 r e a d f i l e −f o r m a t vhd l ” a e s w r i t e m u x . vhd ”
19
20 c u r r e n t d e s i g n a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n
21 l i n k
22
23 u n i q u i f y −f o r c e
24
25 compi l e −m a p e f f o r t medium
26
27 w r i t e −f o r m a t vhd l −h i e r a r c h y −o u t p u t a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n . vhdg
28
29 e x i t
Figure 5.4: Hardware Synthesis dc shell commands
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every step in time into dump.vpd.
A VPD (Value change Plus Dump) file is a proprietary Synopsys format. It is a bi-
nary file which encodes signal changes over time with additional debug information. VCD
(Value Change Dump) files are an IEEE standard ASCII format file which encode signal
change over time. This flow uses the vpd2vcd utility to convert the output VPD file to VCD
format.
Figure 5.5: Simulation Flow
Once the signal value changes are gathered from a simulation, Synopsys PrimeTime PX
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(pt shell) can be used to calculate the instantaneous power consumption as the signals in the
hardware implementation change value over the simulation time period. PrimeTime also re-
quires an SDC file which must at least define the system clock. The file aes encryption.sdc
defines the system clock to operate with a 20 ns period. The PrimeTime commands are
recorded in power analysis.script. It is important that when PrimeTime reads the VCD
file, it doesn’t consider the testbench signals as part of the power waveform calculations.
This is accomplished with the read vcd parameter strip path.
1 ## Run t h e s i m u l a t i o n
2 ## The do .do f i l e g e n e r a t e s t h e . v p d s i g n a l dump
3 ## I t a l s o i n c l u d e s t h e s i m u l a t i o n t i m e
4 . / s imv −uc l i −do . . / . . / s c r i p t s / do / do .do
5
6 ## Conver t from VPD (VCD+ p r o p r i e t a r y and b i n a r y ) t o VCD
7 ## which i s an IEEE s t a n d a r d , a s c i i , and open
8 vpd2vcd + morevhdl + inc ludemda dump.vpd dump.vcd
9
10 ## Run PrimeTime PX t o g e n e r a t e power waveform
11 p t s h e l l − f i l e . . / . . / s c r i p t s / p o w e r a n a l y s i s / p o w e r a n a l y s i s . s c r i p t
12
13 ## Conver t from b i n a r y FSDB t o g e t f u l l f l o a t i n g p o i n t p r e c i s i o n
14 f s d b 2 n s −fmt o u t −o power wave fo rm.ou t p o we r wa v e f o r m . f s d b
Figure 5.6: Simulation Commands
The create power waveforms command causes PrimeTime to generate instantaneous
power consumption waveforms. The output file can be either FSDB or OUT format. FSDB
is a proprietary binary format and OUT is an ASCII format. The FSDB format results in a
reduced file size. However, since the format is proprietary, it must be converted before the
data can be accessed by evaluation algorithms.
By default, the power calculations are performed with floating point numbers in Prime-
Time. Experimentation determined that commanding PrimeTime to output in the OUT
format resulted in a loss of precision. The utility fsdb2ns can convert from FSDB to OUT
format without a loss in precision. Therefore, PrimeTime is commanded to output the
waveforms in FSDB format and it is converted to OUT format with the fsdb2ns utility.
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1 dump − f i l e dump . vpd
2 dump −add AES ENCRYPTION KEN TB −d e p t h 0
3 dump −a u t o f l u s h on
4 dump −d e l t a C y c l e on
5 dump −f o r c e E v e n t on
6 run 28000
7 e x i t
Figure 5.7: Simulation Executable Commands
The output waveforms from PrimeTime record the power consumption only when sig-
nals change value. Therefore, only event based power consumption information is avail-
able. The output files record the time when the event happened and the associated power
consumption.
The output waveform files can consume a significant amount of memory when many
of them are stored. There are several factors which affect the resulting file size. These
include the duration and resolution of the simulation as well as the number of levels for
which the power consumption is recorded in the output file. By default, the power con-
sumption is recorded for each entity in the target design. Using the argument -levels 1 to
create power waveforms causes the tool to only record the power consumption of the en-
tire circuit and the top level. Since these traces are identical, the output waveform is parsed
by the script parse out.pl. It removes the duplicate channel of information and some un-
necessary header information.
The final step of simulator.pl is to compress the output waveform and move it to an
archive. The script will repeat all of these steps until the specified number of simulations
have been completed. In addition to executing the associated commands, the simulator.pl
script also generates a random input plaintext vector for each simulation and writes it to the
output waveform filename. This is a simple way to associate the two pieces of information
for the evaluation algorithms to use.
The entire simulation process requires about 30 seconds per trace on the server used
for this experiment. In order to decrease this time on average, some of the resources have
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1 s e t p o w e r e n a b l e a n a l y s i s t r u e
2 s e t s h s o u r c e u s e s s e a r c h p a t h t r u e
3 s e t p o w e r r e a d a c t i v i t y i g n o r e c a s e t r u e
4 s e t p o w e r a n a l y s i s m o d e t i m e b a s e d
5 s e t p o w e r u i b a c k w a r d c o m p a t i b i l i t y t r u e
6
7 s e t s e a r c h p a t h ” . . / . . / s r c / l i b / snps . . / . . / s r c / h d l / g a t e . ”
8 s e t l i n k l i b r a r y ”∗ c o r e t y p . db ”
9
10 r e a d v h d l a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n . vhdg
11 c u r r e n t d e s i g n a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n
12 l i n k
13
14 r e a d s d c . . / . . / c o n s t r a i n t s / a e s e n c r y p t i o n k e n . sdc
15
16 r e a d v c d \\
17 − s t r i p p a t h AES ENCRYPTION KEN TB / THE AES ENCRYPTION KEN \\
18 dump . vcd
19 u p d a t e p o w e r
20 r e p o r t p o w e r
21 r e p o r t p o w e r −h i e r a r c h y
22
23 c r e a t e p o w e r w a v e f o r m s \\
24 −f o r m a t f s d b −o u t power waveform . f s d b − l e v e l s 1
25 e x i t
Figure 5.8: PrimeTime PX Simulation Commands
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been duplicated in order execute in parallel. The scripts are modified in order to run with
an instance number so each reads and writes to files allocated specifically for that instance.
Four separate instances are run on an eight core server for this experiment. With this
configuration, the average time per trace is reduced by a factor of almost four. This can be




The goal of evaluation algorithms is to successfully determine secret key information with
a high degree of confidence and low overhead costs. The algorithms require access to a
number of instantaneous power consumption traces sampled over the time during which
the secret key was used to encrypt the given plaintext.
This goal is supported by several concerns which drive design decisions. The main
concerns are maintaining data precision and achieving a high level of computational per-
formance. Data precision must be maintained in order to avoid losing information which
may be valuable to the attack. Timing accuracy is less of a concern since it is assumed the
power traces are accurately capturing the power consumption when the target execution
sequence is exercised. Choosing to operate on a subset of the provided samples in order
to improve performance requires the maintenance of this timing accuracy. Computational
performance is indirectly proportional to execution time and the amount of required system
resources.
This documentation represents the evaluation algorithms which operate on power traces
generated from hardware simulations. These algorithms are very similar to those designed
for physically extracted power traces. The major difference between the two is that the
simulations performed generate event based power consumption values. This results in
lower memory requirements and more possible performance improvements at the cost of a
slightly higher level of complexity.
The event based nature of the simulation power traces presents the first major design
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decision. The timing of the power measurements is based on signal activity events. Signal
activity depends on the data values being computed. Therefore, a specific power sample
event will only occur in some of the traces and not in others. If a data bit is evaluated to
zero in one trace and one in another trace, the event and power sample will be recorded in
one trace and not another. It also may be possible but less likely that the timing of an event
can change. This means that the event occurs in both traces but at different times. This can
occur if the bit being considered is determined based on more than one other signal which
are evaluated at different times. If the bit is activated in two traces based on two different
logical paths with different delays, the resulting event can occur at two different times.
This is a problem since when the differential traces are calculated, the power consumption
of the activated bits would not be added at the same point in time in the resulting aggregate
waveform. They would be spread across two or more points in time which would decrease
the amplitude of the power consumption and associated differential spike.
Therefore, the event based traces present two concerns. One is that it is possible for the
same bit event to occur at two slightly different times. The other is that the power consump-
tion is recorded as zero between events. One possible solution is to maintain the previous
power consumption value over every time interval until a new value is provided. This
makes it likely that bit events slightly offset from each other over time will overlap on the
power consumption trace. These evaluation algorithms do not implement this technique. It
is only mentioned as a possible area of future work.
The event based simulation traces also provide multiple power consumption values at
the same instance in time. This is assumed to result from multiple events at the same time





The evaluation algorithms are designed for and implemented in Java. The first part of the
design includes reading in each of the input power traces from the filesystem. The traces
have a plaintext input vector associated with each one. It is recorded as the filename of
the trace file for simplicity. The goal is to build a pair of differential traces for each key
guess. The key guess is a byte of the cipher key. Therefore, there are 256 possible key
guesses and 256 pairs of differential traces. The differential traces are developed by adding
corresponding samples of the current differential trace to the input trace.
Figure 6.1: Evaluation Algorithm Accumulate Design
The trace of the differential pair used to accumulate the input trace is determined by
a selection function. Therefore, for all possible key guesses, the selection function deter-
mines which trace of the differential pair associated with that key guess accumulates the
input trace. This accumulation is to become an average. Therefore, there is also a counter
associated with each trace of each differential pair for every key guess. The counter records
61
how many traces have been accumulated into that trace.
Selection Function
The selection function is required to separate traces into two accumulating buckets for
each key guess. The inputs to the function are the key guess and plaintext used for the
encryption. The parameters are listed in Figure 6.2. The first three are used to choose the
exact target bits used for the attack. The target bytes are the result of the first Add Round
Key and Byte Substitution operations. Therefore, they correlate to the bytes of the plaintext










Figure 6.2: Selection Function Definition
It is also possible to set the number of target bits and where they are located within the
target byte. The target bits must be sequential within the target byte. The final parameter
is the multi-bit DPA threshold value. Figure 6.3 shows how these parameters are used to
choose which bin to accumulate the current trace into.
The selection function identifies the plaintext byte with the targetByteNum parameter.
It then combines that with the key guess byte with an XOR operation (Add Round Key).
Next the resulting byte is substituted in the AES s-box table. This results in the target byte.
The target bits are identified with the targetNumBits and targetBitsOffset parameters. The
Hamming Weight of the target bits of the target byte is calculated by counting the number
of active bits.
The targetThreshold parameter determines which bucket the trace is added to based on
the Hamming weight of the target bits. The first line of Figure 6.3 shows how the Hamming
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Figure 6.3: Selection Function Threshold
Weight is separated into buckets when only a single target bit is used and the threshold is set
to one. Any value greater than or equal to the threshold is put into one bin. Any Hamming
Weight value less than or equal to the total number of target bits minus the threshold (zero)
are put into the other bin. These parameters render the selection function equivalent to a
single-bit DPA attack.
The other two lines use multiple target bits and result in a multiple-bit DPA attack. The
threshold parameter identifies the number of active target bits required for a trace to be
placed in either bucket. It also indirectly identifies the traces which are not placed in either
bucket. The Hamming Weight values in Figure 6.3 that aren’t inside of a rectangle are not
used for the attack. Also, if the threshold is set low so that certain Hamming Weights can
be used in both bins, the traces cancel each other out since the difference between them is
zero. In this implementation, such traces are ignored and not accumulated in the differential
traces.
The goal of this multiple bit thresholding is to polarize the Hamming Weight of the
target bits which end up in each bin. It also ignores traces which have target bits with
similar and moderate Hamming Weights.
Once all traces have been considered, the algorithm iterates through each differential
pair. Every accumulated power value in each trace is divided by the number of traces
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accumulated into that trace. This effectively averages the accumulated trace. Then the two
traces in each differential pair are subtracted from each other one value at a time. Any
negative resulting values are converted to positive values. This results in one differential
trace per key guess.
6.2 Maintaining Precision
It is important to maintain the precision of the original power consumption samples. The
original samples are 32-bit floating point precision numbers. This allows for roughly seven
significant decimal digits. If many traces samples are summed together and maintained
in this format, the resulting sums can get large. When this happens, the floating-point
arithmetic will automatically drop the least significant digits if more significant digits are
required by larger values. This is dangerous since the difference in power consumption
between one or a few more active bits is small in comparison to the power consumption
of the overall hardware implementation. Also, the output waveforms have time intervals
where there are several individual power measurements grouped together. It is necessary
to ensure that a smaller value will not be overshadowed and lost due to a larger value.
Therefore, it makes sense to maintain the large sums in a 64-bit double-precision floating
point format. This format can maintain about 16 significant decimal digits.
6.3 Performance Improvements
The first performance enhancement applied to the evaluation software was to convert the
ASCII OUT power consumption waveforms into a binary format which can be read from
the software. The simplest way to accomplish this is to serialize Java objects and write
them to a file. A Trace object was created which encapsulates two primitive arrays of ints
and floats. A method was written to parse the OUT files and instantiate a Trace object.
Then the object was written out to a file. This conversion enhances the software in two
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ways. First, it decreases the file size. The file size was reduced by about 58% from the
uncompressed ASCII to the binary format. The other benefit is faster access time. Access
time is reduced because smaller files result in less overall data being transferred. Also, the
parsing work only happens once. The software can immediately access the data inside of
the serialized object.
The power consumption changes due to the evaluation of the target bits only occurs
during a very narrow time window. Therefore, it is unnecessary to compute over all samples
of the entire simulation. Another performance enhancement is to reduce the overall window
of the samples which are used in the evaluation. The conversion software was modified in
order to only include times between the start and 4.02 µs. That time includes the entire
first AES round. The entire simulation requires 28 µs. This improvement reduced the size
of the serialized object file by about 76%. This improvement reduces storage requirements
and decreases execution time.
Since the simulation waveforms are event based, there is no power consumption sample
data available for many of the time intervals. Also the time intervals with information may
change from trace to trace. Simply instantiating enough storage for all time intervals results
in a lot of memory being allocated but not used. Therefore, a method was created in order
to profile all of the traces and record which time intervals have data values associated with
them. The resulting timing profile was written to a file which could be read in at the
beginning of each simulation. The timing profile provided the total number of samples that
would ever be used as well as the associated time intervals.
In addition, a method was developed which translates a given time interval to an index
of an array which stores the sample data. A model of this translation is shown in Figure
6.4. A HashMap object is used to store key/value Integer pairs. The map key is the time
interval from the waveform file. The key can be used to access the value which is the index
of an array used to store the samples. This array only stores information for time intervals
with at least one associated event. It would also be possible to store the samples directly
in the map. The disadvantage to this is that the map must only contain objects and not
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primitives. Manipulating objects on a very large scale such as this results in a very large
overhead. The overhead is created from allocating and freeing many objects. This would
happen each time a sample value changes.
Figure 6.4: Translating a Time into an Index
By not allocating memory for time intervals which do not have any associated power
samples, the memory footprint of the program was reduced considerably. Figure 6.1 shows
how the memory footprint changes.
Entire Simulation Reduced Time Profiled
Data Samples 2,800,000 402,000 6,770
× 8-Byte Doubles 22,400,000 3,216,000 54,160
× 2 Differential Traces 44,800,000 6,432,000 108,320
× 256 Key Guesses 11,468,800,000 1,646,592,000 27,729,920
Table 6.1: Evaluation Algorithm Memory Requirements (bytes)
The first data column represents the requirements when memory is allocated for every
time interval during the entire simulation (28 µs duration with 10 ps precision). The next
column shows how this changes when the duration is reduced to 4.02 µs. The final column
represents the profiled memory requirements where memory is only allocated for the time
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intervals associated with power consumption samples (4.02 µs duration).
The first data row shows the number of time intervals or samples required for each
configuration. Then this number is multiplied to represent the memory requirements of a
full attack.
These reductions are significant to the overall execution time of the evaluation algo-
rithms. This is because the reduced and profiled configuration is the only one which is
smaller than 1 GB when all differential traces are held in memory at the same time. It is
possible to attack with one key guess at a time, but then all power traces must be read into
memory 256 times. Attacking one key guess at a time causes file access to the hard disk
to become the major bottleneck. The reduced memory footprint of the reduced time and
profiled configuration allows the differential traces for all key guesses to be held in main
memory simultaneously. This greatly reduces total execution time.
Trace Hard Disk CPU Execution Time
File Size Usage Utilization Per Trace
Original 976 KB ≈ 40 MB/s ≈ 5% 20 ms × 256 = 5.12 s
All Improvements 99 KB ≈ 1 MB/s ≈ 100% 125 ms
Table 6.2: Evaluation Algorithm Performance Improvements
All of these improvements together reduced trace file size by about 90%. There is about
a 40x improvement in trace throughput. These improvements allow attacks to include many





In order to analyze the results of the Power Analysis Attacks, it is necessary to develop a
measure of success. A simple measure of success is whether the attack can determine the
correct target secret key information. It is also valuable to determine a measure of how
strongly the results point to a specific key guess. This value will be called the Confidence
Ratio. It is defined as the maximum value of the differential trace of a key guess divided by
the maximum value of all of the differential traces from all other key guesses. Therefore,
a ratio greater than one conveys that the associated key guess is more likely than any other
key guess to be the true target value. The higher the Confidence Ratio, the more likely the
associated key guess is the correct value.
ConfidenceRatio =
maximum(differential trace(key guess))
maximum(differential trace(all other key guesses))
(7.1)
During analysis of an attack, it is also valuable to determine the costs associated with
the attack. The most obvious value which could be used for this is the execution time of
the attack algorithm. Others may include things such as the amount of memory and the
number of power consumption traces required.
The results in this section have been generated from the evaluation of simulated power
traces. The attacks performed are single and multiple bit DPA. The target hardware is the
Custom Iterative AES implementation. The cipher key is one which is specified as a test
vector in the AES Standard. The cipher key is: 0x00 0x01 ... 0x0E 0x0F [5]. The hardware
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is simulated with a 50 MHz clock over one encryption lasting about 28 µs. Only the first
4,020 ns of the simulation are used for the attacks. All bytes of the input plaintext are
generated randomly. The order the traces are applied is random but fixed. Therefore, each
specific attack applies the power traces in the same order, but this order was generated
randomly.
Differential Trace
A differential trace of the correct key byte guess is shown in Figure 7.1. The attack is of the
ninth byte of the cipher key. The evaluation is of seven target bits with an offset of zero and
a threshold of five bits. The correct key byte is 0x09. The five data points which represent
the largest differences have been annotated on the diagram. Next to each point is the time
at which this peak occurs.
Figure 7.1: Differential Trace of the Correct Key
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These specific times are when the target bits are being processed or transported in the
hardware implementation simulation. Figure 7.2 shows a simulation waveform annotated
with cursors set for the same time values.
Figure 7.2: Custom Iterative Hardware Simulation Waveform
The first pair of differential spikes occur when the target byte is generated by the combi-
national s-box implementation (1820 and 1860 ns). The first spike is due to the value being
generated by the combinational logic and charging the transmission lines to the memory.
The second spike is on the next rising edge of the clock when the data is written into mem-
ory. The differential trace spikes again during the Shift Rows operation when the target
byte is read from memory and written into a different location in the state memory.
The final spike occurs during the Mix Columns operation. The spike appears when the
second column is read and the byte in that column and the second row is written. The reason
the spike is during the second column read is because the shift rows operation transported
the target byte from the third column to the second column. Most likely the reason the
spike doesn’t occur until the byte from the second row is calculated is because of how the
Mix Columns operation multiplies the bytes in the column. When the output byte for the
first row is calculated, the input byte from the second row (the target byte) is multiplied by
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three. This is equivalent to a logical shift (multiply by two) and an XOR with the original
value (addition of itself). It is likely that the logic which performs this multiplication is
connected directly to the output from the state memory. Therefore, the lines which were
charged with the value of the target byte are short and the operation doesn’t consume much
power. However, when the output byte for the second row is calculated, the target byte is
multiplied by two which is just a bit shift. Therefore, the target bits would be propagated
through more circuitry which is likely to consume more power.
Single Bit DPA Results
The first set of results is from single bit DPA attacks of the hardware implementation.
Figure 7.3 shows the confidence ratio for the correct key value for several instances of the
attack.
Figure 7.3: Single Bit DPA Final Confidence Ratios
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All eight bits of bytes two and nine were attacked with Single Bit DPA. Ten thousand
traces were utilized with each attack. All 16 attacks resulted in the correct key byte guess
being pointed to as the most likely value except one. It’s interesting that the resulting
confidence ratios are similar but not identical for the specific bit attacked across the two
different target bytes. This likely correlates to the hardware wiring. Since each byte is
operated on over the same circuits, this is to be expected.
Figure 7.4 shows how these ratios change as more and more traces are utilized in the
attack. There are still ten thousand total traces being applied.
Figure 7.4: Single Bit DPA Confidence Ratio as Traces are Applied
When there are few traces accumulated by the evaluation algorithm, there is a lot of
uncertainty and noise. Also, none of the attacks point to the correct key guess. The confi-
dence ratio settles as more and more traces are applied to the attack. The one attack which
failed is the light blue one at the bottom of Figure 7.4. It’s interesting that it actually points
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to the correct key guess for a short period of time with a low level of confidence before
ultimately pointing to the incorrect key guess.
In order to determine whether this bit could be attacked with any significant and stable
level of confidence, another attack was mounted. This time one hundred thousand traces
were used to try to guess the correct key byte. The results are shown in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5: Lowest Resulting Confidence Ratio Extended to 100,000 Traces
With enough traces, the attack determines the correct key guess with a much higher
level of confidence. Also the confidence level settles to a much more stable value.
Multiple Bit DPA Results
Multiple Bit DPA attacks are designed to boost the resulting differential spike. The expec-
tation would be that this would result in higher overall levels of confidence than with single
bit attacks. There are also many more possible ways to mount different Multiple Bit DPA
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attacks. This experiment attacks two different target bytes with every possible combination
of number of target bits and target bits threshold which is not equivalent to a single bit
attack. The offset of the target bits in the target byte is always zero. Figure 7.6 shows the
final confidence ratios for these attacks after ten thousand traces were applied.
Figure 7.6: Multiple Bit DPA Final Confidence Ratios
The numbers on the x-axis represent the number of target bits considered and the thresh-
old value applied. Generally speaking, utilizing more target bits results in a higher confi-
dence ratio for the correct key guess. This is not the case, however, for the very highest
threshold values. For example, on the far right of Figure 7.6, all eight target bits are consid-
ered and in order to qualify for accumulation into the differential trace pair, the target byte
must resolve to all zeros or all ones. This attack on both of the target bytes fails to predict
the correct key guess. The likely explanation for this is that there are very few traces whose
associated plaintext and key guess result in all zeros or all ones. Therefore, these attacks
are using a very small number of traces in comparison to the other attacks. This can cause
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a problem since the goal is to use many traces which help to average out noise. There is a
trade-off between using a higher-threshold in order to polarize the Hamming Weight of the
target bits and a lower threshold which averages many traces.
Figure 7.7 shows the confidence levels for the multiple bit DPA attacks as traces are
applied. There are similarities to the same graph for single bit attacks. One difference is
that the confidence ratio of the attacks are more distributed.
Figure 7.7: Multiple Bit DPA Confidence Ratio as Traces are Applied
In order to determine the confidence level the most confident attack configuration settles
at, an additional attack was mounted which took advantage of one hundred thousand traces.
The result is shown in Figure 7.8. The attack never gains a higher level of confidence for
the correct key guess than with the ten thousand trace attack. This is important to show that
at a certain point, the application of more traces does not increase the ratio of the correct
key guess.
75
Figure 7.8: Highest Resulting Confidence Ratio Extended to 100,000 Traces
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Finally, in an attempt to directly compare single and multiple bit DPA attack results, all
of the attack confidence levels at the end of the ten thousand trace attacks were averaged
for single and multiple bit attacks. The resulting relationship is described in Figure 7.9.
Even with the poor performing high threshold multiple bit DPA attacks, those attacks well
out perform the single bit attacks.
Figure 7.9: Final Correct Confidence Ratio Comparison
The success of an attack is also related to the cost of performing it. Therefore the
execution running times of the attacks was recorded. The memory footprints are identical.
The single bit attacks completed after about 1723 seconds on average. The multiple bit
attacks were finished after about 920 seconds on average. The multiple bit attacks were
complete after about half of the time required for the single bit attacks. The reason for this
is that the multiple bit attacks do not accumulate all traces. Many of them are ignored when
the calculated target bits don’t qualify for accumulation by the selection function.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
This research pulls together many of the fundamental ideas behind Power Analysis Attacks.
A methodology is developed which describes how to identify, extract, and evaluate power
consumption information with the goal of successful attacks. The process is broken into
parts so that the extraction can be described for both a physical implementation and hard-
ware simulations. The research also identifies the key concerns which must be attended to
during specific steps of the attack in order for it to be a success.
Utilizing hardware power simulations for attacks is valuable in several ways. It allows
a researcher to evaluate a hardware design without the complexity of the physical power
extraction. This can be especially important when attempting to develop designs which are
resistant to attacks. Attacking hardware power simulations also makes it possible to test
different attack evaluation algorithms in a more controlled manner.
The evaluation algorithms for single and multiple bit DPA are described in detail along
with steps which can be used to optimize the process for reduced memory footprints and
lower execution time.
Finally, several single and multiple bit DPA attacks are mounted against hardware simu-
lated power traces. Multiple bit attacks often identify a secret key byte with a higher degree
of confidence than single bit attacks unless the threshold is set very high. The multiple bit
attacks also execute in less time making them the best choice for power analysis attacks.
There is still many more research opportunities available in this area. The main topics
to be addressed include mounting a successful attack on a physical implementation, further
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standardize attack methodology, and utilizing other attack evaluation methods.
Physical power extraction is a complex coordination of several components. This makes
it difficult to successfully attack. Future work includes removing all capacitors connected
to the FPGA power rail on the hardware platform. It would also help to generate power
from a well regulated external supply. Identifying and utilizing the right oscilloscope is
also important.
The attack methodology can still be further standardized. For example, it would be
valuable to define a single standard file format in which to store power consumption sam-
ples. That would make it possible to use a single set of evaluation software for all attacks.
Finally, there are other methods of performing Power Analysis Attacks. Further re-





The goal of physical power extraction is to capture high quality traces in an efficient and re-
peatable manner. A trace is of high quality if the power samples it contains clearly relate to
operations and data transfers performed on the target platform and implementation. Since
Power Analysis often requires many traces, it is important that the process of capturing,
transporting, and storing traces is efficient.
There are several concerns which require attention during physical extraction. These
concerns directly support the goal of extraction. Table 9.1 shows the relationship between
these concerns and both trace quality and capture efficiency.
Trace Quality Capture Efficiency
Noise •
Measuring Precision and Accuracy • •
Communication and Coordination • •
Automation Performance •
Table 9.1: Physical Power Extraction Concerns
Measured noise is represented by changes in the sampled power signal that are not
related to the execution of the target implementation or the relationship the attack is seeking
to exploit. Noise only affects trace quality. There are many sources from which noise can
be produced. These sources include electrical components which are both unrelated to the
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system and indirectly related. For example, an unrelated component could be one which is
part of the hardware platform but is not used for the attack in any way. An indirectly related
component could include one which is used for support but whose power consumption
is independent of the target relationship. The power supply can also be responsible for
considerable noise. For example, a linear supply produces less noise than a switching
supply.
One of the main features of Differential Power Analysis is that it averages many power
traces. The result of this is a reduction of noise unrelated to the target relationship. Mini-
mizing noise can enhance this effect and reduce the amount of traces required for an attack.
Noise can be reduced by disconnecting or disabling unnecessary components. Supporting
components can be disabled during the moment when the trace is gathered. Board capaci-
tance reduces noise but also dampens changes due to the target relationship.
Figure 9.1: Top Level Physical Flow
Measuring precision and accuracy is entirely dependent on how the oscilloscope is
configured. Scope settings determine the amount of time after a trigger event samples are
gathered. They also determine the rate at which samples are gathered. If the accuracy of
the measurement is off, the samples will be gathered at the wrong time and trace quality
will be compromised. A slow sampling rate will lose information. An excessively high
sampling rate will only increase the amount of data which must be gathered, transferred,
and stored.
System level responsibilities such as communication and coordination of information
and events affect both trace quality and efficiency. The correct plaintext and/or ciphertext
must be attributed to the correct power trace. These concerns affect capture efficiency to a
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larger degree. Traces can be gathered quickly with an efficient system level scheme. This
includes the choice of the method by which trace data is communicated. Efficiency may be
limited by the chosen oscilloscope.
Automation performance is determined by the method chosen to repeat the system level
coordination and communication over many traces. This concern is independent of the
quality of the power traces. It only affects the efficiency of the capture process.
9.2 Development Platform
The Altera Cyclone III Development Board is the platform used for the physical imple-
mentation attacks. The only components used for the experiments are the FPGA, UART
lines, and the USB interface for programming the FPGA. Figure 9.2 shows the development
platform with the major components identified.
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Figure 9.2: Altera Cyclone III Development Board [11]
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A Terasic THDB-J2S HSMC Daughter Board (Figure 9.3) is connected to the HSMC
A port of the development board in order to provide serial RS-232 UART support. This is
used for communication between the hardware design and an application running on the
host computer. The FPGA hardware design is configured to disable the serial UART when
power measurements are taking place.
Figure 9.3: Terasic THDB-J2S HSMC Daughter Board [14]
The schematic in Figure 9.4 describes how the power regulator which provides power
to the Cyclone III FPGA core is configured. It regulates 3.3V down to 1.2V. The output
voltage marked 1.2V is a supply for the Ethernet PHY. An improvement to the hardware
platform would include removing this resistor in order to remove the Ethernet PHY and its
supporting capacitors from the power path completely.
The voltage available from the point labeled 1.2V INT provides the FPGA core power.
The FPGA core power is measured across resistor R49. There are several capacitors which
provide bulk capacitance to the FPGA core. There are many more decoupling capacitors
which shunt high frequency noise to ground. Bulk capacitors can be identified by their
large amount of capacitance. They provide charge when the regulator has not yet reacted
to an increased need for current.
The power regulator is an LTC3418 8 amp 4 MHz Monolithic Synchronous Step-Down
Regulator. It is configured on the development board in Forced Continuous Mode. The
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Figure 9.4: Development Board FPGA Core Power Regulator [12]
voltage level can be verified with the equation from the datasheet.
1.2V OUT= 0.8(1 + R58
R59
)
1.2V OUT= 0.8(1 + 5.1 kΩ
10 kΩ
)
1.2V OUT= 1.208 V
(9.1)
The amount of bulk capacitance required to keep the supply voltage level stable can be





Rosc = R68 = 30.1 kΩ





According to th e regulator datasheet, it requires several cycles to respond to changes in
power consumption. The amount of charge required during this time can be calculated as
in Equation 9.3. This is assuming the maximum 8A of current is required and the regulator
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Q = 17.84 µC
(9.3)
The required charge must be stored in the capacitors. The supply voltage must not
significantly drop or the FPGA will malfunction. Assuming that the charge required is 5%
of the total charge stored in the capacitors results in about 200µF required capacitance.





C = 198 µF
(9.4)
However, there are many more capacitors placed near the FPGA. Many of them are
large enough for bulk capacitance. The schematic for these capacitors is shown in Figure
9.5. The capacitors connected across 1.2V INT are for the FPGA. The capacitors connected
across 1.2V are for the Ethernet PHY.
The FPGA core capacitor values and quantities are outlined in Table 9.2 in order of de-
creasing capacitance. The total capacitance resulting from all of these capacitors is about
1250µF . That is in addition to the 200µF at the output of the power regulator. The differ-
ence between 100 MHz and 500 MHz passive oscilloscope probes is less than 10pF . This
capacitance averages the voltage across the power measurement resistor.
The Research Center for Information Security (RCIS) has designed hardware platforms
specifically for Side Channel Attack research [17]. The boards they offer have no capacitors
between the power supply and the device under test. It may be necessary to remove all
capacitors connected to the power lines. Another improvement which could be applied to
the hardware platform is to remove the noisy switching power supply. It can be replaced
by a cleaner external linear regulator.
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Table 9.2: FPGA Core Bulk and Decoupling Capacitor Values
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9.3 Power Measurement Configuration
The power measurement configuration describes the manner in which an oscilloscope is
mated with the target hardware platform. Figure 9.6 represents a model of the configu-
ration. The capacitors with red crosses over them have been removed from the hardware
platform.
Figure 9.6: Power Measurement Configuration
The oscilloscope and probes contain resistive, inductive, and capacitive elements which
affect the measured power consumption. The passive resistive element acts as a voltage di-
vider which scales the amplitude of the measured signal. Often the resistance in the probes
and the scope causes the measured voltage to be divided by ten. Many scopes automatically
detect the type of probe used and compensate for this attenuation. An inductive element
can cause the signal to oscillate. The most important element is capacitance. Capacitance
dampens the measured signal [3].
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Since any capacitance is impeding high frequency components of the signal, it makes
sense to consider what frequency range of signals are valuable for power analysis. It is not
easy to determine an exact range of frequencies of interest. The architecture of the Cyclone
III FPGA masks this information. The maximum frequency of the instantaneous power
consumption is related to the fastest rise time of the hardware interconnects of the FPGA.
This information isn’t publicly available from Altera for competitive reasons. Further com-
plicating matters is the fact that exact implementation is determined by the Quartus II Fitter.
Therefore, the final implementation is a combination of Logic Elements placed in certain
locations with different length interconnects between them.
Figure 9.7: Cyclone III Architecture [16]
Altera specifies that the maximum synchronous operation of the memory blocks is 315
MHz. The maximum rate of the clock tree is 437.5 MHz [16]. Therefore, it is assumed that
a bandwidth of 500 MHz can measure the signals of interest.
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It is also important to ensure that all channels on the scope are referenced to the same
ground. Initially one of the channels was connected across R49 (Figure 9.6). Of that
channel, the main line was connected to one side of R49 and the reference was connected
to the other side. The probe connected to the trigger was referenced to the true ground.
Inside the scope, all grounds are connected together. Therefore, this created a path from
power to ground inside of the scope. With the mega-ohm probes it only caused a voltage
divider without a lot of current. When connected in this manner with the low resistance
active-FET probes, a lot of current was passed and the probes quickly heated up.
9.4 Oscilloscopes
Three different oscilloscopes have been used during this research. Each has its benefits and
drawbacks. There are also lessons that can be learned from using each scope. The three
main parameters describing each scope are shown in Figure 9.3.
Tektronix Tektronix Agilent HP
Oscilloscope TDS 3012B TDS 8000B Infinium 54810A
Type Real-Time Equivalent-Time Real-Time
Maximum Sampling Rate 1.25 GS/s 100 TS/s 1 GSa/s
Maximum Bandwidth 100 MHz 20 GHz 500 MHz
80E04 Sampling Module
Probes Tektronix P3010 Tektronix P6209 Tektronix
100 MHz 4 GHZ Active FET 200 MHz
Table 9.3: Oscilloscope Parameters
One of the main differences between the scopes is real-time versus equivalent-time
capture capabilities. A real-time oscilloscope samples and stores an entire trace after a
single trigger event. An equivalent-time scope gathers one sample per trigger event. It
counts the amount of time after a trigger event until a sample is to be captured. For the next
sample, the whole process is repeated with a slightly longer delay from the next trigger
until the next sample is gathered.
One result from this difference is that the sampling rate of a real-time oscilloscope
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is limited by the rate at which the analog-to-digital converters and digital memory can
convert and store samples. The sampling rate of an equivalent-time scope is limited only
by the precision of an internal clock. The trade-off of this enhanced sampling rate is that it
must be possible to repeat the entire sequence to be measured once for each sample to be
gathered.
Tektronix TDS 3012B
The first oscilloscope used was the TDS 3012B. The system level configuration with this
scope is shown in Figure 9.8. The computer programs the FPGA over JTAG. A Java pro-
gram runs on the computer which controls and coordinates the system. The hardware
running on the FPGA was configured over RS-232 UART. It was also used to send plain-
text and receive ciphertext. The software communicates with the scope over TCP/IP. This
connection was used to download the power traces after each execution. The scope settings
were initially configured with a web browser. The settings can be saved to a file and loaded
again at a later time.
Figure 9.8: TDS 3012B Configuration
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There are two problems with this configuration. The first is that the scope itself has
only 100 MHz of bandwidth. This is not enough bandwidth to capture the high frequency
changes of the target implementation. The other problem is that the communication inter-
face is over Ethernet. The scope will not keep the TCP connection alive after a trace is
transferred. The overhead of creating a new connection and that of downloading the trace
from the scope is significant. Approximately 15 seconds is required per trace. This may
result in many days of capturing traces.
Tektronix TDS 8000B
The Tektronix TDS 8000B is an equivalent time oscilloscope. The included sampling mod-
ule and probes allows this scope to capture signals with a very high bandwidth. The scope
also has hardware similar to a full computer and it runs Windows 2000.
Figure 9.9: TDS 8000B Configuration
The software for the scope doesn’t provide a way to automatically save each trace as it
is captured. Therefore, the best way to automate this is to write software which communi-
cates with the scope through the Virtual Instrument Software Architecture (VISA). This is
an industry standard for communicating with test equipment. Tektronix provides its own
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implementation of these software libraries which are installed on the scope.
The main disadvantage with this scope is triggering instability. The Simple Circuit
hardware design was rebuilt so that the execution and trigger could be repeated multiple
times directly from the hardware. This is necessary since one trigger is necessary for each
sample which is captured by the scope. It would take an excessive amount of time if the
computer was required to coordinate the execution for each sample over RS-232.
In a fully automated system, the computer has no feedback from the scope when a
full trace is captured. Therefore, it assumes the scope will capture 4,000 samples when
it configures the hardware implementation to execute and trigger 4,000 times. Triggering
instability caused the scope to miss some of these triggers or count one of them multi-
ple times. This results in the computer and scope becoming out of synchronization. The
captured samples no longer line up with the beginning of each trace.
Agilent HP Infinium 54810A
The Agilent 54810A scope was chosen because it is a real-time scope with a high band-
width. As shown in Figure 9.10, an Agilent VISA library installed on the host computer
provides a way to control the scope and communicate the captured power traces.
This scope is the best option of the three. It offers sufficient bandwidth and real-time
capabilities. It is relatively simple to control with C code built with the Agilent VISA
software libraries. The traces can be transferred over Ethernet after each capture, but this
consumes little time as the Agilent software maintains a network connection created for
this purpose.
VISA Programming
The VISA libraries provide a mechanism to open a session with a scope and communi-
cate directly with it from within custom software. This communication can take place
over GPIB, RS-232, LAN, and USB interfaces. Code using the VISA libraries can send
commands and receive data back from the scope.
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Figure 9.10: Agilent HP 54810A Configuration
Commands allow remote setting and querying all scope parameters. It is also possible
to register event handlers to receive notification of events of interest. Figure 9.11 shows
the commands used to configure the Agilent 54810A scope. Earlier code reset the scope to
factory default settings. This is a good method to ensure the exact settings on the scope.
It is also valuable because the settings can be marked up with comments in the code. It is
also more flexible than simply saving the configuration because the configuration can vary
at runtime and can be changed in between tests automatically.
Using the VISA libraries may be the only way to gather many traces automatically. This
is accomplished with the 54810A by sending the :Digitize command. Then the *OPC?
command is sent which returns when the pending operation is complete. After sending the
:WAVEFORM:DATA? query, the waveform data can be read from the scope. The data can
be formatted in several different ways.
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1 / / A c q u i r e S e t t i n g s
2 sendData ( ” : ACQUIRE : POINTS 200 ” ) ; / / any v a l u e 16 t o 32768
3 sendData ( ” : ACQUIRE : SRATE 1 . 0 E9” ) ; / / s p e c i f i c v a l u e s , 1 GSa / s max
4 sendData ( ” : ACQUIRE :AVERAGE ON” ) ;
5 sendData ( ” : ACQUIRE :AVERAGE:COUNT 100 ” ) ;
6 sendData ( ” : ACQUIRE : INTERPOLATE OFF” ) ;
7
8 / / T r i g g e r S e t t i n g s
9 sendData ( ” : TRIGGER :HOLDOFF 60E−9” ) ; / / 60 ns <= HOLDOFF <= 320 ns
10 sendData ( ” : TRIGGER : LEVEL EXTERNAL, 1 . 2 5 0 ” ) ;
11 sendData ( ” : TRIGGER :SWEEP TRIGGERED” ) ;
12 sendData ( ” : TRIGGER :EDGE:SOURCE EXTERNAL” ) ;
13
14 sendData ( ” :SYSTEM:HEADER OFF” ) ;
15
16 sendData ( ” :WAVEFORM:FORMAT ASCII ” ) ; / / {ASCII | BYTE | WORD}
17
18 / / Channel Commands ( V e r t i c a l )
19 sendData ( ” :CHANNEL1: DISPLAY ON” ) ;
20 sendData ( ” :CHANNEL2: DISPLAY ON” ) ;
21 sendData ( ” :CHANNEL1:PROBE 1 .000E+01 ,RATIO” ) ;
22 sendData ( ” :CHANNEL2:PROBE 1 .000E+01 ,RATIO” ) ;
23 sendData ( ” :EXTERNAL:PROBE 1 .000E+01 ,RATIO” ) ;
24 sendData ( ” :CHANNEL1:RANGE 4 .000E+00 ” ) ; / / v o l t a g e over a l l d i v s
25 sendData ( ” :CHANNEL2:RANGE 4 .000E+00 ” ) ;
26
27 / / T imebase S e t t i n g s ( H o r i z o n t a l View )
28 sendData ( ” : TIMEBASE : POSITION 20E−9” ) ;
29 sendData ( ” : TIMEBASE :RANGE 200E−9” ) ;
30 sendData ( ” : TIMEBASE : REFERENCE LEFT” ) ; / / {LEFT | CENTER | RIGHT}
Figure 9.11: Agilent 54810A Programming Commands
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